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In 2016, the LabOnt Research Group and the 
University of Turin organised a workshop entitled 
Philosophy and Medicine, which gathered together 
philosophers of medicine, language, and cognitive 
science. The central aim of the workshop was to 
articulate the relationship between philosophy, 
ethics, and clinical practices. In the same year, the 
Italian journal Medicina e Storia published a 
selection of the papers presented at the workshop, 
which covers a variety of topics ranging from 
theoretical issues in psychiatry to ethical and 
linguistic problems in health communication. The 
message arising from the issue is that no single 
aspect relating to the theoretical exploration of 
medicine can be understood in isolation from the 
others. For instance, no ontological problem can be 
appreciated irrespectively of scientific metho-
dologies and conceptualisations. Likewise, no ethical 
question can abstract away from some sort of 
ontological discussion on what health and disease 
are. For this reason, each contribution of the issue 
touches many intertwined questions. 
Since I cannot exhaustively discuss all of them in 
this review, I focus here on two major topics 
discussed throughout the issue: first, how 
philosophical perspectives on language and ethics 
can advise medical practices; second, how 
philosophical perspectives on health and disease can 
inform contemporary psychiatric nosology. 
The first topic I shall consider is how medical 
practices and health communication can benefit 
from a dialogue with philosophy of language, 
epistemology, and ethics. Although these theoretical 
branches may seem to be somehow distinct from 
each other, they turn out to be rather interconnected 
in medical practice. As Francesca Ervas, Marcello 
Montibeller, Maria Grazia Rossi and Pietro Maria 
Salis show in their paper Expertise and Metaphors in 
Health Communication (ivi, pp. 91-108), the 
diagnostic process generally involves complex 
inferential procedure aimed at comparing a patient’s 
symptoms and anamnesis with the doctor’s medical 
knowledge. On this view, doctors must be able to 
disclose the aetiological factors of a given pathology, 
identify its potential treatment, and frame the 
patient’s experience into a clinically-significant 
picture. In this tortuous process, health professionals 
need remarkable efforts to effectively communicate 
with patients about their condition as well as to 
suggest prevention and therapeutic strategies: that 
is, they have «to transfer to the patient a set of 
information that justifies, on a rational basis, 
decisions that will impact patients’ everyday life» 
(ivi, p. 98). On the other hand, as Vera Tripodi 
argues in her paper Epistemic Injustice and Medical 
Diagnosis (ivi, pp. 147-157), diagnosis usually relies 
on the patients’ ability to describe their symptoms as 
precisely as possible – after all, patients are the very 
experts on their feeling. This two-way transfer of 
knowledge makes clinical practices incredibly 
delicate. 
Ervas and colleagues analyse shortcomings in 
communication from health professionals to 
patients and point at metaphors as invaluable 
epistemic devices to grasp a given technical, 
otherwise obscure concept (e.g., the characterisation 
of a disease as well as its aetiological factors) by 
means of another, more familiar one. More 
precisely, metaphors can help doctors characterise 
the disease in simpler terms, frame the patients’ 
experience, and drive them towards a specific 
therapeutic pathway. These aspects are especially 
relevant in the case of chronic conditions, such as 
cancer and diabetes, where patients’ compliance, 
education, and self-management are of central 
importance for healing. 
Tripodi, in turn, analyses shortcomings in the 
communication from the patient to health 
professional. Medical diagnoses can be affected by 
how a patient describes her/his symptoms. 
Moreover, epistemic injustice can characterise this 
interaction, i.e., some groups (e.g., women and 
ethnical minorities) are statistically more exposed 
than others (e.g., men) to the experience of not 
being heard by doctors or health professionals. In 
other words, some people’s epistemic authority 
tends to be systematically underestimated in the 
clinical context, and this can hinder the therapeutic 
process (on the notion of epistemic injustice see M. 
FRICKER, Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of 
Knowing, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007). As 
Tripodi explains, this sort of epistemic injustice may 
be due to how different groups (e.g., men and 
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women) tend to describe their symptoms. 
According to previous studies, male patients 
generally present themselves as well-aware about 
their illness and potential treatment, able to observe 
their pain extensively, and to take their pain 
seriously (see J. VODOPIUTZ, S. POLLER, B. 
SCHNEIDER, J. LALOUSCHEK, F. MENZ, C. 
STÖLLBERGER, Chest Pain in Hospitalized Patients: 
Cause-specific and Gender-specific Differences, 
in: «Journal of Women’s Health», vol. XI, n. 8, 
2002, pp. 719-727). By contrast, female patients 
tend to favour an emotional self-description, to not 
take their pain as serious, and seem to be not 
particularly interested in knowing the cause of the 
pain. The solution Tripodi identifies is to review 
clinical practices in such a way to enhance the ability 
of patients to describe their symptoms and to make 
them aware of how important first-person 
experience is in this context. 
The paper Raising Awareness of How Asperger 
Persons Perceive Their Capacity to Use Metaphors 
(ivi, pp. 129-136) by Lucia Morra exemplifies how 
beneficial philosophical perspectives might be to 
medical practices, too. The paper uncovers the 
relevance of linguistic analyses to our understanding 
of the Asperger Syndrome (hereafter, AS). Morra 
presents a selection of web exchanges among people 
affected by AS focused on how they understand and 
use metaphors in linguistic interactions (data come 
from the discussion forums of Wrongplanet.net, a 
web community designed for individuals affected by 
various conditions (e.g., Autism, Asperger Syn-
drome, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) as 
well as for their relatives and health professionals). 
The data presented challenge the received view that 
misunderstanding metaphors is a distinctive mark 
of AS individuals when compared with neurotypical 
ones. Rather, the way people in general process 
metaphors depends on many variables (e.g., age, life 
experience, available information, context of 
utterance). As Morra suggests, it is well possible that 
the difference between neurotypical and AS 
individuals lies in one or more of these variables. 
To conclude this first part of my review, in the 
paper entitled Hopes and Limits of Moral 
Bioenhancement (ivi, pp. 75-90), Maurizio Balistreri 
discusses an inherently ethical problem, i.e., the 
possibility of improving people’s moral behaviour by 
intervening on their biology (e.g., through medical 
treatments, drugs, brain stimulation, or genetic 
engineering). For the sake of the argument, the 
author assumes that biotechnological advancements 
will eventually make this possible. The question is: 
will this improve people’s moral compass? 
Balistreri’s answer is negative. The advocates of 
moral bioenhancement generally assume that virtue 
produces good consequences for the others, but no 
specific psychological state is necessary for this. In 
other words, what matters to them, is the external 
behavioural outcome. As Balistreri argues, this 
assumption seems to be problematic: although bio-
enhanced people may be prevented from acting 
immorally, they can still have bad intentions. 
Biotechnologies could eventually attenuate negative 
emotions but, at the very least, we need to improve 
people’s motivations and their ability to act morally 
for the right reasons – and this can be better achieved 
through social and educational strategies. 
The distinction mentioned above between 
behaviour and psychological states leads us to the 
second major topic discussed throughout the issue, 
i.e., the relationship between the symptomatic 
expression of mental disorders and their biological 
basis. This relates to important ontological and 
epistemological questions, raised by Elisabetta 
Lalumera and Cristina Amoretti, surrounding the 
definition of mental disorder. The fifth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental 
Disorders (DSM-5) advances a descriptive, 
symptom-based approach, according to which a 
mental disorder is a collection of symptoms 
associated with some psychobiological or biological 
dysfunction and significant distress (painful 
symptom) or disability (impairment in one or more 
important areas of functioning). The focus on 
symptoms, rather than on causal and aetiological 
factors, is intended to enhance the dialogue among 
scholars from different theoretical frameworks to 
psychopathology. Indeed, different frameworks can 
endorse widely different aetiological interpretations 
but, at present, there is no definitive reason to 
favour one over the other. As Lalumera says, «if the 
etiological basis [of mental disorders] were known, 
they could possibly be included in the cha-
racterizations of specific disorders. Given that they 
are not, descriptivism […] within the criteria 
remain[s] the best options» (ivi, p. p. 117). In the 
paper “Saving the DSM-5? Descriptive Conceptions 
and Theoretical Concepts of Mental Disorders (ivi, pp. 
109-128) Lalumera outlines many criticisms towards 
the DSM’s descriptive approach and defends 
descriptivism as a viable approach for contemporary 
psychiatry. By contrast, Amoretti, in her paper The 
Concept of Mental Disorder: Between Definitions and 
96              Recensioni 
 
 
Prototypes (ivi, pp. 57-74), highlights the limits of 
descriptivism and scrutinises some alternatives. Let 
us consider the two articles one by one. 
To defend the DSM’s descriptive approach, 
Lalumera takes classificatory systems as serving 
different purposes in different contexts. For 
instance, a system can be suited for diagnosis while 
others offer explanation or treatment. Importantly, 
in some contexts, the categories need to be reference-
fixing (i.e., they need to refer to “real” entities) while, 
in other contexts, they do not. To clarify this, 
Lalumera introduces the distinction between 
concepts and conceptions. Concepts can be 
understood as corresponding to “natural” categories 
– the extension of which is identified by scientific 
theories. By contrast, conceptions can be 
understood as categorisation procedures or non-
exhaustive points of view on the nature of the 
category. Notably, «what makes something 
member of a category (expressed by a concept) 
should not be confused with how we usually and 
preferably recognize it as such (the conceptions); in 
philosophical terminology, metaphysics should not 
be confused with epistemology» (ivi, p. 111). So, 
mental disorders correspond to theoretically 
informed concepts (possibly representing natural 
kinds) associated with descriptive conceptions that 
enable diagnosis and health communication. 
According to Lalumera, the problem with DSM is 
not descriptivism per se, but rather the use of 
diagnostic criteria to fix reference, which implies a 
conflation of conceptions and concepts. 
The context-dependence of psychiatric catego-
risations is somehow present in Amoretti’s paper as 
well. The author compares two alternative 
characterisations of mental disorder. On the one 
hand, the DSM defines a disorder as collection of 
symptoms reflecting some sort of dysfunction and 
usually associated with distress or disability (see the 
definition above). On the other hand, the 
prototypical view holds that disorders cannot be 
defined in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. That is, the category membership does 
not depend on any specific property (e.g., a 
dysfunction), but rather on the overall similarity of 
an individual to the prototypical disorder under 
examination with respect to some relevant factor. 
Amoretti identifies various problems with both 
characterisations. For instance, the DSM’s definition 
includes theoretical terms, such as “mental” and 
“function”, that are not adequately clarified. The 
prototypical definition, instead, opens the door to 
some sort of indeterminacy as it relies on the 
identification of the relevant factors accounting for 
the proximity of an individual to the prototype. But 
relevant to whom, and for what purpose? Since 
many human conditions share “relevant” 
commonalities with psychopathologies (e.g., sadness 
and major depression, shyness and social phobia), 
the prototypical approach seems to be unable to 
draw a clear-cut distinction between health and 
disease. Amoretti opts for a pragmatic way out and 
suggests that no single concept of mental disorder is 
capable of accounting for any purpose in scientific 
research and medical practices. Rather, different 
contexts require different conceptualisations of 
disorders, together with different classificatory 
systems. (A similar view characterises the Research 
Domain Criteria project, promoted by the US 
National Institute of Mental Health, which aims at 
developing a new taxonomy for research purposes. 
See https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/ 
rdoc/index.shtml). 
The author concludes by submitting a 
“conceptually-clear” definition of mental disorder 
aimed at serving theoretical purposes – with no 
presumption of exhaustivity with respect to clinical 
objectives. According to this definition, mental 
disorders must involve some sort of dysfunction, i.e., 
the inability of a mental mechanism to perform its 
function and contribute to higher-order systemic 
capacities (or general goals) in a statistically typical 
way. Of course, as Amoretti admits, determining 
what the higher-order capacities of a system are, as 
well as what counts as “statistically typical”, can 
depend on pragmatic choices and arguably is 
population- or environmental-specific. 
To conclude, let me stress once again how 
important the interaction between ontological, 
epistemological, ethical, and practical aspects is in 
the study of living beings. An aspect highlighted in 
many of the papers reviewed is that health and 
disease can hardly be understood in terms of 
necessary and sufficient properties. This connects 
medicine and psychiatry to two important 
theoretical frameworks: first, the prototypes theory, 
addresses epistemological questions about how we 
tend to categorise the world (E. ROSCH, C. B. 
MERVIS, Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal 
Structure of Categories, in: «Cognitive Psychology», 
vol. VII, n. 4, 1975, pp. 573-605); second, the 
Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, coming from 
the natural kinds debate, investigates the 
metaphysical basis of scientific categories (see R. 
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BOYD, Realism, Anti-foundationalism and the 
Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds, in: «Philosophical 
Studies», vol. LXI, n. 1-2, 1991, pp. 127-148).  
Both these theories, with their recent deve-
lopments, point at the complexity of the biological 
world. On the epistemological side, the world seems 
to be too chaotic to expect humans to be able to 
categorise things in simple, essentialist terms. On the 
ontological side, the world seems to be too muddled 
to assume just one – and only one – way to “carve 
nature at its joints”. As many authors have argued in 
recent years, no medical nosology can identify 
purely mind-independent, value-free categories in 
the outside world: pragmatic choices and human 
interests are needed to specify what “joints” matter 
to us. At present, pluralism seems to be the only 
viable option – the burden of arguing the opposite 
should lie upon its detractors. However, no matter 
how philosophy of science will develop, understand-
ding living beings requires undertaking inter-
disciplinary efforts, and this makes philosophy of 
medicine a complex and fascinating research field. 
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